In this research we focus on the roles of experience and understanding in fostering integrative negotiation performance. We report on two experiments in which we distinguish between understanding opponents' general priorities among issues versus understanding their speciWc gains for particular oVers. Although experience enhanced integrative performance even in the absence of understanding, we found that understanding the speciWc gains had an incremental eVect on performance. We conclude that while generally acknowledging opponents' interests is not suYcient, the additional inferential step of assessing their speciWc gains throughout the negotiation process is advantageous.
Negotiation is a continual interpersonal interactive process of decision making, in which participants perceive and interpret the information available to them and proceed to act on these perceptions. Improving negotiation skills and increasing the ability to negotiate eVectively is crucial not only in managerial, political, and business contexts, but in all avenues of life. A primary topic of negotiation research concerns the achievement of integrative agreements as opposed to distributive agreements. Distributive agreements represent agreed divisions of a Wxed pie of resources, where one side's gains are the other side's losses. Integrative agreements, in contrast, reconcile the interests of both parties, and lead to higher joint beneWt (Pruitt, 1983; Walton & McKersie, 1965) . The present research seeks to gain a better understanding of the roles of experience and of cognitive processing in fostering integrative negotiation performance.
Many negotiation situations contain integrative potential, i.e., an increase in the joint gain available to the negotiators over and above the joint gain aVorded by a Wxed-sum solution (Thompson, 2001) . In negotiations involving complex agendas where several issues are under consideration, integrative agreements can be achieved through diVerent speciWc strategies (e.g., Bazerman, 2001; Thompson, 2001) . In this research we focus primarily on one of these integrative strategies, namely "logrolling," which is an appropriate strategy for creating value when parties have diVerent priorities among issues. It speciWcally refers to a strategy whereby value is created by each party conceding on low priority issues in exchange for concessions on issues of higher priority.
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task can improve negotiators' integrative outcomes (e.g., Bazerman et al., 1985; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Thompson, 1990a Thompson, , 1990c Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994; Thompson & Hastie, 1990) . However, important questions concerning the nature of the learning process involved in such repeated experience remain unanswered, particularly questions about the precise link between experience, cognitive understanding, and performance.
An important and relevant distinction has been made in the decision-making literature between experience and expertise (Bazerman, 2001; Dawes & Corrigan, 1974; Hammond & Grassia, 1985; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Neale & Northcraft, 1990) . Experience is deWned as repeated feedback that typically leads to mindless behavioral modiWcation and to habitual learning that does not necessarily require understanding. Expertise, on the other hand, is deWned as developing a "strategic conceptualization," understanding what constititutes an eVective strategy and why, and consciously monitoring the process. While experience is mainly eVective for performing a speciWc task, a central feature of expertise is the ability to be adaptive to changes in situational demands and to eVectively transfer skills across diVerent tasks.
As Neale and Bazerman (1991) note, negotiators' high quality outcomes can be a result of one of three processes: (1) randomly selecting an eVective strategy without any knowledge of what he or she has done correctly, (2) learning a particularly eVective script from experience, but having little understanding why this particular script works in this particular situation, or (3) acquiring a strategic conceptualization of negotiation situations that summarizes when and why particular strategies are eVective (i.e., expertise). Similarly, Thompson (1990b Thompson ( , 1990c points out that in repeated negotiations with a particular task that has a limited number of optimal solutions, reaching an integrative agreement does not necessarily require the negotiator's improved understanding of the other party or of the underlying integrative potential. It can also be reached by the negotiator merely stumbling upon an optimal agreement, which is a speciWc script that works in the particular task, without comprehensively understanding the situation.
Hence, examining learning by solely looking at performance in an unchanging setting limits the ability to capture the nature of the underlying learning process involved. Indeed, research on learning integrative negotiation skills has not been limited to the study of performance in a speciWc task. The degree to which experience enhances the depth of understanding and expertise has also been examined, by measuring negotiators' assessments of the other parties' interests and utility functions (e.g., Thompson, 1990a Thompson, , 1990c Thompson, , 1992 Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994; Thompson & Hastie, 1990) Thompson, 1990a Thompson, , 1990c . However, to date, the Wndings of such studies are inconclusive.
Although experience has commonly been found to result in improved assessments of the opponent's interests (e.g., Thompson, 1990a Thompson, , 1990c Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994; Thompson & Hastie, 1990) , there are some indications that the improvement in understanding due to mere experience is rather limited. For example, in a study by Thompson (1992) , even when negotiators bargained under ideal conditions-with immediate, clear, and complete process feedback-their judgments of the other party remained faulty. Moreover, positive transfer of integrative negotiation skills to diVerently structured tasks was not easily achieved, and typically required more than simple repeated experience (e.g., Bereby-Meyer et al., 2004; Loewenstein et al., 1999; Mannix et al., 1991; Thompson, 1990a Thompson, , 1990c .
Previous studies are also inconclusive regarding the role of improved understanding in enhancing subsequent integrative behavior. On one hand, many authors have emphasized the key role of judgment accuracy for achieving improvement in integrative negotiation performance (e.g., Thompson, 1990a Thompson, , 1990c Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994; Thompson & Hastie, 1990) . Gaining information about the other party has been shown to be an important factor in eYcient bargaining (e.g., Bazerman & Carroll, 1987; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; RaiVa, 1982; Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990; Zeng & Sycara, 1998) . On the other hand, some work, including work referring to perspective taking, suggests that even if negotiators possess knowledge about their opponents' priorities, they may not have the ability or the motivation to actually use this information during the negotiation process (e.g., Bazerman, 2001; Carroll, Bazerman, & Maury, 1988; De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel, 2000; Pinkley, GriYth, & Northcraft, 1995; Samuelson & Bazerman, 1985; Shubik, 1971) .
A number of recent studies provide additional indications that acknowledging the other parties' priorities may not be suYcient for accomplishing integrative outcomes, and that while using this information appropriately at the negotiation table may be a key factor, it is not straightforward (Gentner, Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003; Nadler, Thompson, & Van Boven, 2003) . These studies typically demonstrated instances where integrative negotiation performance was inferior, even though negotiators had full information and/or were highly accurate about the priorities of the other party.
In line with the distinction between possessing and using information, we distinguish in the present study between two types of judgment accuracy: (a) judging the other parties' general proWt schedules, and (b) assessing their speciWc gains for particular oVers that are exchanged during the negotiation process. As mentioned above, previous studies relied mostly on the elicited assessment of the other party's general proWt schedule-i.e., assessment of the opponent's payoV schedule for each of the negotiating issues-as their measure for judgment accuracy (e.g., Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994; Thompson & Hastie, 1990) . This measure can indicate the degree to which the negotiator understands the other party's priorities, i.e., whether the negotiator accurately assesses which issues are more important and which are less important to the other party. However, we argue that negotiators may understand their opponents' proWt schedules in general terms, yet still not apply and further process this knowledge in order to estimate what their opponents might gain from diVerent proposals throughout the negotiation process.
We maintain that the processing of information from the opponent's perspective can be an important contributing factor to successful negotiations. This idea is consistent with the literature on the role of perspective taking in negotiations. Previous research (Bazerman & Neale, 1982 , 1983 found that negotiators who had a greater tendency to think about the perspective of others were more successful in their negotiations. This increased attention to the perspective of the other party allowed them to better predict their opponents' goals, expectations, and reservation points, all keys to negotiating successfully. In the present study, we therefore examined the role of understanding, and in particular the role of increased information processing that entails focusing on and thinking about the other's perspective. The latter was examined by measuring assessments of the other party's speciWc gains for particular oVers (also used in the study by Moran & Ritov, 2002) . We used this measure in addition to the more common measure-judgment of the other party's general proWt schedule.
Finally, we ask whether negotiators' integrative performance can improve as they gain experience, without any type of understanding. There are several indications in the literature that even if enhanced understanding and more accurate processing of information does improve integrative negotiation performance, such improvement may also occur without increased understanding. For example, Moran and Ritov (2002) found that proposing highly integrative counter-oVers did not necessarily require improved understanding of the other parties' interests. Even in the study by Thompson and DeHarpport (1994) , where the main Wnding supported the notion that judgment accuracy plays a key role, there is evidence that it may not be a necessary condition. Although in their study integrative performance improved to the greatest degree for those participants who received maximum feedback and showed the largest improvement in judgment accuracy, the performance of negotiators who received no feedback at all also improved over time, even though there was no parallel improvement in their judgment accuracy.
Taken together, previous Wndings suggest that although repeated integrative experience may lead to improved assessment of the other parties' general priorities, it may not lead to high levels of cognitive processing and understanding of the other parties' perspective. Moreover, although improved understanding can enhance integrative negotiation performance, it may not be a necessary condition. In the present research employing two experiments, we aim to further explore the links between experience, cognitive understanding and processing, and performance in both unchanging (Experiment 1) and changing (Experiment 2) environments.
Experiment 1
In the Wrst experiment we concentrated on the initial stages of the negotiation process, and examined the eVects of experience in an unchanging setting. Our focus on the initial stage was motivated by the intriguing evidence provided by Thompson and Hastie (1990) that most of the eVective learning for integrative negotiations occurs during the Wrst few minutes of the negotiation. An additional motivation for focusing on the initial stage stems from the robust Wndings regarding the crucial role of initial oVers in negotiations. The fact that the value of the initial oVer has been found to have a great impact on the Wnal agreement in distributive negotiations (see Benton, Kelley, & Liebling, 1972; ChertkoV & Conley, 1967; Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Liebert, Smith, Hill, & KeiVer, 1968; Rubin & Brown, 1975; Yukl, 1974) , suggests that the antecedent of an integrative agreement may already be revealed in the initial oVer. Indeed, this notion was supported in a recent study by Moran and Ritov (2002) , where participants with no previous experience with the negotiation task evaluated and responded to diVerent initial oVers forwarded to them by an opponent. In that study, the speciWc composition of the initial oVer was found to have an eVect beyond the already documented eVect of its total value. In particular, logrolling opening oVers (characterized by high inter-issue variance) led to more logrolling counter-oVers and integrative agreements than equal value non-logrolling opening oVers (with low inter-issue variance).
In the present study, we employed the same methodology but focused on the role of experience. We Wrst looked at the eVect of experience on understanding, and then continued to explore the eVects of experience and of understanding on promoting integrative performance.
Based on the above literature review, we hypothesize that:
H1. Integrative experience will increase the accuracy of assessing the other parties' general priorities.
Given the robust Wndings on the positive eVect of experience on integrative negotiation performance, our second hypothesis is: H2. Integrative experience will lead to more integrative performance in the initial stage of the negotiation As presented in the introduction, there are some indications that having information about the opponent does not guarantee improved integrative performance. Notwithstanding, if, as proposed by many researchers, understanding enhances integrative performance, then:
H3a. Greater accuracy in assessing the other parties' general priorities should lead to more integrative performance, over and above the eVect of integrative experience, and H3b. Greater accuracy in assessing the other parties' speciWc oVer values should lead to more integrative performance, over and above the eVect of integrative experience.
Lastly, if as suggested in the introduction improved understanding is not a necessary condition for improved integrative performance over time, then we predict: H4. Integrative experience will enhance integrative performance, over and above the eVects of accuracy in assessing the other parties' general priorities and of accuracy in assessing the other parties' speciWc values for the given oVers.
Method Participants
One-hundred and thirty undergraduate Management and Industrial Engineering students participated in the experiment as part of a class exercise. Eighty-six participated in the experimental condition and an additional 44 participated in an external control condition. All of these students were inexperienced with regard to participation in multi-issue laboratory negotiation tasks.
Procedure
The research paradigm we employed was adapted from Bazerman et al. (1985) (modiWed from the methodology originally developed by Kelley, 1966 , Pruitt & Lewis, 1975 . The experimental condition was run in three separate sessions (N's were 22, 28, and 36). At the beginning of each session, participants were given an information package that included a description of the task as a free market negotiation. They were told that the market consists of representatives of two diVerent company types, "Type A" and "Type B," who shall engage in two-party negotiations in which three issues were negotiable. Participants were randomly and evenly assigned to be representatives of Type A or Type B companies. All Type A's and all Type B's received identical information. All participants were told to attempt to gain maximum proWt during the Wxed market period (20 min), by reaching agreements with as many representatives as possible of the other type of company (Type B or Type A, respectively). Each participant also received an "individual" proWt schedule specifying his/her proWt for each level of each of the three issues (see Appendix A). As in Bazerman et al. (1985) , the proWt span (maximum potential proWt) diVered between issues, and participants had incomplete information: they did not receive information concerning their opponents' proWt schedule. As can be seen in Appendix A, issue "R" was a distributive issue, and issues "D" and "F" were logrolling issues. The minimum agreement pie for this negotiation was $8000. Splitting this minimum pie equally between the two parties would aVord each of them $4000. Integrative agreements-i.e., agreements resulting in a pie greater than $8000, might be obtained by parties logrolling on issues D and F. An optimal integrative agreement could be reached when parties logrolled and agreed on transaction terms of level 1 for issue D and level 9 for issue F. Such an agreement would lead to a combined proWt of $10,400 for both negotiators, with each of them gaining at least $4000-the amount he or she would gain from an equitable non-integrative agreement (i.e., equally splitting the minimum $8000 pie).
1
After 10 min of reading instructions and proWt schedules, participants were randomly matched for the Wrst negotiation and proceeded to engage in a 20-min simulation of the market. They Wlled out a negotiation report after each negotiation, in which they speciWed the sequential number of the negotiation (Wrst, second, etc.), whether an agreement was reached, and the terms agreed upon (if agreement was achieved). Upon completion of the report, participants were randomly rematched by experimenters with a partner with whom they had not previously negotiated.
When the market terminated, participants proceeded to engage in a test phase. We gave each participant an additional page of instructions, in which we requested him or her to presume that he or she was negotiating the identical task with another opponent in the same market. At this stage, participants were presented with a single initial oVer, supposedly forwarded by this new opponent, and spent up to twenty minutes completing a questionnaire referring to the initial oVer.
Two initial oVer types were manipulated between subjects, one high variance-logrolling, and one low variance-distributive (no logrolling). The overall value of the two types of oVers from the participants' perspective was held constant. The larger pie (combined value) of the logrolling oVer was due to the fact that it was worth more to the other party than the distributive oVer. Appendix A shows the proWt schedules and the initial oVers that were submitted. As can be seen, both the integrative and the distributive oVers forwarded to "Type A" participants ("2-3-9" and "5-6-6," respectively) were worth a total value of $4800 for their recipient. However for the other party (the supposed initiator), the integrative oVer was worth more than the distributive one: $5300 and $3500, respectively.
2 The same was true with respect to the two oVer types forwarded to "Type B" participants ("4-4-5" and "1-7-8").
In the questionnaire, participants Wrst assessed the initial oVer's attractiveness for themselves and for the other party, 3 and then were requested to:
(a) Assess the initial oVer's value for the initiator on each of the issues: They were requested to assess what the initiator's proWts would be on each of the three issues: "D," "R," and "F," for the level he or she had presumably oVered. (b) Propose a counter-oVer. (c) Estimate the other party's general proWt schedule, by assessing the lowest and highest value for him or her on each of the issues. Participants were again presented with their own proWt schedule, together with an identically formatted blank proWt schedule. They were asked to assume that the blank schedule was that of the other party. Their task was to Wll in the values of the minimum and the maximum levels of each of the issues, reXecting their assessment of the other party's proWt schedule.
A potential limitation of the above described method is that although proWt schedules were given as private information, we did not include safeguards against participants sharing this information. Consequently, in order to directly test the role of information availability, we included an external control condition with an additional 44 participants from the same subject pool as the participants of the experimental condition. The procedure for these participants was similar to the procedure used for the experimental condition, except that after they read the instructions and their own proWt schedules, the participants were given the full proWt schedule of the other party. They were allowed to examine the other party's proWt schedule for Wve minutes, after which it was collected by the experimenter. Then, without engaging in any actual negotiations, participants proceeded to engage in a test phase identical to the test phase in the experimental condition.
Measures
Integrative experience. Two measures of integrative experience were included:
(1) Experiencing integration: In tasks of the type we used in the present experiment, i.e., repeated negotiations in unchanging integrative markets, Wnding the optimal integrative solution could be an "aha!" experience, where the proverbial light goes on. Therefore, we chose to measure integrative experience primarily by classifying participants into those that did (coded as 1) versus those that did not (coded as 0) reach at least one optimal integrative agreement during the market session. An optimal agreement was deWned as one for which the pie score, i.e., combined proWts of both parties, was $10,400. (2) Extent of prior integrative experience: Since learning the optimal agreement might involve a more gradual, accumulative process (rather than an insight type of experience), we additionally measured the extent of each participant's integrative experience by computing his or her aggregate pie score for the entire market (i.e., summing up all his or her agreement pie scores). Hence, participants with higher aggregate pie scores had more integrative negotiation experience than those with lower aggregate pie scores.
Integrative performance. Our measure of integrative performance was the counter-oVer response: Integrative performance in the test phase was measured in terms of the counter-oVer's pie score, i.e., the combined proWts of both parties associated with the counter-oVer they proposed in the questionnaire. The more integrative (logrolling) the counter-oVer, the higher the pie score.
Understanding. Two judgmental measures were included to measure the diVerent levels of understanding and processing the other party's interests:
(1) The general estimation error: Our measure is a revised version of the common judgmental measure used in several previous studies by Thompson and her colleagues to measure understanding the other party's interests (Thompson, 1991; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994) . As reported in the Procedure section, when estimating the other party's proWt schedule, participants assessed only the lowest and highest value on each of the issues. We used these values to compute the assessed proWt span of the other party for each issue by subtracting the lowest value from the highest one. For example, if the participant assessed the highest possible value (the maximum potential proWt) for the other party on issue "D" to be $2000 and the lowest possible value (the minimum potential proWt) on that issue to be $0, the assessed proWt potential span for issue "D" would be $2000 ($2000 minus $0). We then computed the diVerence between the other party's assumed proWt span and the other party's actual proWt span (as determined by their proWt schedule) for each issue. The sum of these diVerences across the three issues is the estimation error, which served as our measure of the accuracy of the estimation of the other party's proWt schedule.It is important to note that the critical integrative aspect negotiators should understand concerning the other parties' general proWt schedule is their priorities among the issues. In the present study this would manifest itself by negotiators of Type A estimating that for their opponents-i.e., Type B-issue F has a smaller proWt span (and is therefore less important) than issue D. Similarly, negotiators of Type B should estimate that for their opponents-i.e., Type A-issue D has a smaller proWt span than issue F (see Appendix A). For speciWcally assessing whether participants understood this point, we classiWed them into two groups: those who did versus those who did not accurately assess the other party's proWt span to be smaller for their least important issue than for their most important issue. The correlation between this measure and the general estimation error was extremely high (r D .923), suggesting that the latter is also an appropriate measure of understanding this critical integrative aspect. Given the high correlation, using both measures would be redundant, and we chose the general estimation error, which is more commonly used. (2) The speciWc estimation error: As explained in the introduction section, negotiators may acknowledge their opponents' proWt schedules in general terms, but this does not necessarily mean they can or will apply this knowledge accurately in estimating what their opponents might gain from diVerent speciWc proposals. In order to examine the accuracy of applying information about the other party, we included the estimation of the initial oVer's value for the other party as an additional judgmental measure. For each issue, we computed the absolute diVerence between the actual and the assumed value of the initial oVer for the other party. The sum of these diVerences across the three issues is the speciWc estimation error, which served as our measure of the accuracy of assessment of the oVer's value for the other party.
Results
The zero order correlations among the diVerent potential predictors of integrative performance are presented in Table 1 . These include the two measures of experience (experiencing integration and the extent of integrative experience), the initial oVer type, and the two estimation errors (the general estimation error and the speciWc oVer estimation error).
Not surprisingly, the two measures of understandingthe general estimation error and the speciWc oVer estimation error-were signiWcantly correlated. Given the theoretical importance of distinguishing between these constructs, and since the correlations between them-although signiWcant-were not extreme, we continued in our subsequent analyses to consider both and to assess the unique role of each of them.
There was also a signiWcant correlation between the two measures of integrative experience-experiencing integration and the extent of integrative experience. As explained in the Method, the extent of prior integrative experience is a measure of the negotiator's aggregate pie score (or joint proWt score) for the entire previous market, which indicates the overall integrative experience that each participant accumulated throughout the market. Experiencing integration, on the other hand, merely depicts whether the participant did or did not reach at least one optimal integrative agreement during the previous market session. If discovering the optimal integrative solution is typically an insightful, "aha!" experience, then this would be a more appropriate measure of experience. Hence we next explored whether or not there was evidence in our market session data to support the "aha!" hypothesis. We primarily tested this notion by examining whether the probability of reaching an optimal agreement signiWcantly increased after previously succeeding in reaching one such agreement.
Initially, we found that with the exception of one participant, all reached at least one agreement during the market period, with an average of 4.8 (SD D 2) agreements per participant. Moreover, on average, 36% (SD D 0.3) of the participants' agreements were optimal, with most participants (73%, N D 62) reaching at least one optimal agreement during the market. For each of the participants that reached at least one optimal agreement, we computed the proportion of optimal agreements that he or she reached after accomplishing the Wrst optimal agreement (excluding ten participants whose Wrst optimal agreement was also their last agreement). In line with the "aha!" notion, a majority of participants (56%; 29 of the 52) always reached optimal agreements after reaching their Wrst optimal one, suggesting that an insight type of experience is highly plausible.
In our subsequent analyses we therefore regard the experiencing integration measure, which corresponds to an insight type of experience as our primary measure of integrative experience. However, given the theoretical importance of distinguishing between the two types of learninginsight versus gradual, and since we cannot rule out the possibility that accumulative gradual learning is also apparent, we brieXy report results regarding the extent of integrative experience measure as well.
We began by examining whether experiencing integration promoted understanding of the other parties' interests. Comparing the understanding measures of participants that did (coded as 1) versus those that did not (coded as 0) reach an optimal integrative solution during the market session revealed that experiencing integration did to some degree promote understanding. In line with H1, the general estimation error was smaller for participants who did expe- We subsequently examined the inXuence of the extent of previous integrative experience on understanding the other parties' interests. Two separate general linear models for testing the eVect of the aggregate pie score (as the independent variable) on each of the understanding measures revealed no signiWcant eVects. Hence, having a greater extent of integrative experience did not promote understanding of the other party.
We next explored the roles of integrative experience and of the two types of understanding in improving integrative performance. With regard to this question we particularly wanted to determine whether experience promoted integrative responses at the initial negotiation stage, whether understanding enhanced integrative behavior beyond the eVect of previous integrative experience, and whether improved understanding was a necessary condition for more integrative behavior.
We addressed these questions by means of a general linear model for predicting counter-oVers (i.e., the counteroVer pie) from experiencing integration (i.e., whether participants did or did not experience integration, coded as 1 or 0, respectively), the two measures of understanding (i.e., the general estimation error of the other party's proWt schedule and the speciWc oVer estimation error of the other parties' oVer outcomes), and the initial oVer type (coded as 0 for distributive and 1 for integrative).
Results of this analysis are reported in Table 2 . As can be seen in the table, the signiWcant predictors of counter-oVer integrativeness were experiencing integration, type of initial oVer, and the speciWc oVer estimation error. The general estimation error (i.e., the assessment of the other parties' general proWt schedule) did not qualify as a signiWcant predictor.
A parallel analysis using the extent of previous integrative experience measure (i.e., the aggregate agreement pie score) instead of the experiencing integration measure revealed a similar pattern of results (although the speciWc oVer estimation was only marginally signiWcant, p < .1). 4 We next turned to asses the role of information as a determinant of the increase in integrative responses. This was tested by comparing the counter-oVers of the experienced participants in the experimental condition with those of the fully informed but inexperienced participants in the external control condition. We found that the mean counter-oVer pie of the original experienced group was signiWcantly higher than the mean oVer pie of the control group (M D 9186, SD D 1062 versus M D 8545, SD D 715), t (128) D 3.6, p < .001. Hence, complete information without experience in an integrative market does not seem to foster an overall increase in the tendency to respond with integrative counter-oVers. This result suggests that acquiring more information about the other party's priorities is not suYcient and cannot fully account for the higher degree of logrolling we observed among experienced negotiators.
To summarize, in the Wrst experiment we found that experiencing integration improved the ability to assess the other parties' general priorities (in line with hypothesis H1) but not the ability to evaluate the other parties' outcomes for speciWc oVers. Moreover, the extent of previous integrative experience did not signiWcantly inXuence understanding. We also found that, as predicted in hypothesis H2, integrative negotiation experience, and the extent of this experience, led to an overall increase in logrolling responses already noticeable at the initial negotiation stage. This enhancing eVect was apparent even when controlling for eVects of understanding (in line with H4) and of information. In addition, while understanding the other party's general interests did not signiWcantly contribute to the tendency to respond in an integrative manner (contrary to hypothesis H3a), being able to correctly assess the speciWc values of the diVerent oVers to the other party did contribute (providing support for H3b, although the eVect was not large).
Discussion
Results of the Wrst experiment imply that much of the improvement in integrative negotiation performance in an unchanging environment can be accounted for by experi- 4 An alternative explanation for the null eVect of general understanding could be that participants who had, even if by accident, come to recognize the "best solution" during the experience phase assumed that this was the expected "correct response" in the test phase as well. In that case, the eVects of understanding would necessarily be bounded. To test for this possibility, we ran an additional general linear model, in which we examined the eVects of the two understanding measures on performance (i.e., on the counter-oVer pie), excluding all participants that gave the optimal "1-5-9" solution as their counter-oVer. The pattern of results for the remaining participants (59 out of 86) did not diVer from that obtained with the full sample. As before, the speciWc oVer estimation was signiWcant, F 1,56 D 5.3, p < .03, while the general proWt schedule error was not. Hence demand characteristics do not seem to be the explanation for the insigniWcant eVect of understanding general priorities.
ence, most likely an insightful, "aha!" type of experience, rather than by merely understanding the other party's priorities and values. Moreover, they indicate that this improvement in integrative performance is already apparent at the initial stage of the negotiation. Indeed, experience promoted not only integrative performance but also assessment of the other parties' general priorities. However, the fact that integrative experience enhanced integrative performance, even when controlling for the eVects of accuracy in assessing the other party's interests, implies that understanding the other party is not a necessary condition for the improvement in integrative behavior.
Results further suggest that while being able to correctly estimate the other parties' general priorities is not suYcient for improving integrative behavior, increased accuracy in assessing the speciWc values of the diVerent oVers for the other party (i.e., accurate processing of the information) is beneWcial. Hence, although the relationship between experience and integrative performance in an unchanging setting does not seem to be mediated by understanding the opponents' general priorities or their speciWc outcomes, the latter may have a signiWcant incremental eVect on integrative negotiations.
It is noteworthy, however, that the way in which we solicited understanding and performance measures in this study constrains its conclusions. Participants were Wrst asked to provide initial oVer estimates, then to make counter-oVers, and Wnally to assess general proWt schedules. Given this order, a possible explanation for the Wnding that initial oVer estimates predicted counter-oVers while general proWt schedule estimations did not, could be that the former were provided before making counter-oVers, while the latter were not. In other words, participants could have adjusted their counter-oVers to match the initial oVer estimates they already made. However, it seems equally likely that participants could also have adjusted their general proWt schedule estimates to their preceding counter-oVer responses. In that case one would expect the correlation between initial oVer and its preceding estimate (i.e., speciWc oVer estimation), and the correlation between initial oVer and its succeeding estimate (i.e., general proWt schedule estimation) to be similarly high. Notwithstanding, given the correlational nature of this study, which limits the causal conclusions that can be inferred, we continued to examine the notion that understanding the opponents' speciWc outcomes has a greater inXuence on integrative performance than understanding their general priorities. This was done in a second study, in which we employed a controlled experiment.
Experiment 2
In the second experiment we further assessed the importance of distinguishing between two levels of understanding the opponent's interests: (a) estimating the opponent's general interest structure, and (b) estimating the opponent's outcomes for speciWc oVers. Results of the Wrst experiment suggest that acknowledging the other party's proWt schedule in general terms is not suYcient for achieving an increase in integrative responses. However, applying this knowledge accurately in order to estimate what the opponent might gain from diVerent proposals, seems to be important and to signiWcantly contribute to the tendency to respond in an integrative manner. The second experiment sought to further examine the impact of considering the opponent's outcomes for speciWc oVers, using a controlled experimental manipulation.
In addition, in Experiment 1 we found that accurately assessing the other parties' speciWc oVer outcomes can improve performance within an unchanging environment.
In Experiment 2, we tested whether such increased cognitive processing could also enhance performance in a transfer task. Appropriate transfer of acquired skills to a novel context is commonly assumed to indicate better understanding and successful learning of general principles, i.e., expertise. Indeed, there is a growing tendency in the literature to explore learning and evaluate training by examining transferability of skills to new contexts (e.g., Day, Arthur, & Gettman, 2001; Ford, Smith, Weissbein, Gully, & Salas, 1998; Singley & Anderson, 1989 ). This tendency is also noticeable in the literature on negotiations (e.g., BerebyMeyer et al., 2004; Loewenstein et al., 1999; Thompson, 1990c) . These studies have typically shown that although gaining expertise and transferring learned negotiation skills is possible, it is not easily achieved. Examples of eVective mechanisms and training schemes that have been proposed are analogical encoding and motivating learning by providing learning goals and values. The present study aimed to investigate the eVectiveness of another training mechanism-focusing the learner on considering the other party's speciWc outcomes throughout the negotiation process.
In an initial training negotiation task we manipulated the negotiators' focus on the other parties' interestsfocusing them either on their opponents' general interest structure or on their opponents' speciWc oVer outcomes. We then examined their performance and understanding of a new task, which was diVerent and more complex than the training task. Consistent with Wndings on role reversal which suggest that having negotiators verbalize each other's viewpoint is beneWcial and increases the likelihood of resolution (e.g., Ball, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1991) , we expect training for perspective taking to be eVective.
Based on the Wndings in our Wrst experiment, we hypothesize that:
H5. Negotiators trained to focus on assessing their opponents' outcomes for speciWc oVers will achieve more integrative outcomes in a transfer task than negotiators trained to focus on understanding their opponents' general proWt schedules.
H6.
Negotiators trained to focus on speciWc outcomes will assess the other party's speciWc outcomes for diVerent oVers more accurately than negotiators trained to focus on general proWt schedules.
Method Participants
Thirty-six students participated in the experiment. We recruited the students via posted advertisements oVering a payment of $12 for participation in an experiment on negotiations. Upon signing up, participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions.
Procedure
The experiment had two between-subject conditions that were conducted separately: A general interest training condition and a speciWc oVer training condition. Both conditions included two stages. The Wrst was a training stage, in which participants repeatedly negotiated the same integrative task. The second stage was a test stage, in which participants negotiated a new integrative task.
In the Wrst stage of both conditions, we randomly assigned participants to the role of buyer or seller in a negotiation market. We then gave each of them an information package which included instructions, a description of the task and of the market procedure, individual proWt schedules, and negotiation report forms. They were told that during the market period, representatives of buying and selling companies would engage in three successive two-party negotiations, with diVerent opponents each time. The negotiation task was similar to the one used in our Wrst experiment. It included three issues (delivery terms, discount level, and terms of payment), and the values of the "individual" proWt schedules were identical to those in Experiment 1 (see Appendix B). As can be seen in the Table, delivery and payment terms were logrolling issues, and discount level was a distributive issue. Hence, an optimal integrative agreement could be reached when parties logrolled and agreed on transaction terms of level 1 for delivery terms (60 days), and level 9 for payment terms (9 payments).
For each negotiation, participants were given a detailed report form to Wll out during the negotiation process. In these forms participants were required to report each oVer that was exchanged during the negotiation, specifying the party who made the oVer (buyer/seller) and the levels oVered on each issue. The negotiator's focus on the other party's interests was manipulated by varying the report requirements in the two experimental conditions, in the following way: In the general interests training condition, after every oVer, participants were requested to provide their estimation of the other party's general proWt schedule, by assessing the lowest and highest possible proWt for him or her on each of the issues. In the speciWc oVer training condition, for every oVer, participants were requested to report-in addition to their own proWts for each of the three issues-their assessment of the oVer's value for their opponent, for each of the three issues. In both conditions, when the negotiation ended participants were requested to report whether an agreement was accomplished and if so to specify its terms.
Prior to the market, participants were given 10 min for reading instructions and proWt schedules. Before each of the three negotiations, the experimenter randomly matched each seller (buyer) with a diVerent buyer (seller) and these dyads were then given 10 min for negotiating. When the third negotiation period terminated, the experimenter collected all materials from the Wrst stage and gave participants a new package with materials for the second stage.
In the second stage participants were assigned roles in a new negotiation task. In this task, representatives of a real estate development company and of a city council negotiated four issues concerning a community development project (adapted from Thompson, Peterson, & Brodt, 1996) . Participants were given individual proWt schedules that indicated their utility points on each of the issues (see Appendix C). As can be seen in the Appendix, among the four issues to be negotiated, payment terms and number of sub-contractors were logrolling issues, retail space was a compatible issue (no conXict of interest was apparent since both parties preferred larger retail space), and open space was a distributive issue. This task diVered from the Wrst one on several dimensions, including context, number of issues, number of alternatives for each issue, and potential integrative strategies (compatible issues in addition to logrolling).
An optimal integrative agreement could be reached by agreeing on seven payments (level 5), four sub-contractors (level 1), and 6000 m 2 of retail space (level 5). In such an agreement negotiators could collectively gain a total of 15,300 points.
In this second task only one negotiation took place. Before negotiating, the experimenter matched dyads that had not previously negotiated with each other during stage 1, and they were allowed 15 min to negotiate. At the end of the negotiation (when time was up or agreement was reached), participants Wlled out a "transaction form" in which they reported whether an agreement was achieved, and if so, detailed the four terms they agreed upon.
At the end of this negotiation, as in Experiment 1, each participant was given an additional page of instructions, in which he or she was requested to presume that he or she was now negotiating the identical task with another opponent. Participants were then presented with a single initial oVer, supposedly forwarded by this new opponent. As in the Wrst Experiment, two oVer types were manipulated between subjects, one integrative and one distributive. The overall value of the two types of oVers, from the participants' perspective, was held constant. However, for the other party, the integrative oVer was worth more points than the distributive oVer. As can be seen in Appendix C, which shows the initial oVers that were submitted, the distributive and the integrative oVers forwarded to the real estate development company representatives ("3-3-3-3" and "4-3-1-2," respectively) were both worth a total value of 5250 points for their recipient. However, for the opponent (the city council representative who supposedly forwarded the oVer), the integrative oVer was worth 7050 points, while the distributive one was worth only 5250 points. The same was true with respect to the two oVer types submitted to recipients representing the city council.
Upon receiving the initial oVer, participants were asked to: (a) assess the initial oVer's value for the initiator on each of the four issues, and (b) estimate the other party's general proWt schedule, by assessing the lowest and highest value for him or her on each of the four issues.
Results
We Wrst assessed our training manipulation by examining whether over the three training negotiations, participants' improved in their assigned tasks in each conditioni.e., in estimating the other parties' speciWc oVer values in the speciWc oVer training condition and general interests in the general interests training conditions, respectively. As negotiations varied in the number of oVers exchanged, we used the decrease in the estimation errors that were made following the Wrst oVer exchange in each of the three consecutive negotiation rounds as a criterion for learning. In both conditions the mean estimation error decreased from the Wrst to the third negotiation. . These results imply that our manipulation was eVective in training the participants as intended.
Although in this research we are primarily interested in participants' performance in the transfer task, we also analyzed the data on performance in the training phase. Given the low incidence of optimal agreements that were achieved throughout the training session: 4 out of 24 agreements (17%) in the general interests training condition and 2 out of 20 (10%) in the speciWc oVer training condition, we continued by focusing on the mean pie size rather than on optimal agreements. We analyzed the mean pie size as a function of negotiation number and found that although the mean pie in both conditions increased over the three training negotiations, this increase was not statistically signiWcant. This insigniWcant increase in performance is not surprising, given that this was a training phase in which participants were required to focus on learning rather than on performance. Indeed, prior research on achievement motivation goals found the main beneWts of learning goals to be apparent in transfer tasks that follow training, rather than in the speciWc training tasks themselves (e.g., Bereby-Meyer et al., 2004) .
Turning to our focal interest in the current study, we next examined the participants' performance in the transfer task. Our main hypothesis (H5) was that negotiators trained to focus on assessing their opponents' outcomes for speciWc oVers will achieve more integrative outcomes in a transfer task than negotiators trained to focus on understanding their opponents' general proWt schedules. In support of this hypothesis, we found the mean combined agreement points to be signiWcantly higher in the speciWc oVer training condition (M D 14,325, SD D 959) than in the Although the estimation errors of the two groups were not signiWcantly diVerent, only participants in the speciWc training condition correctly assessed the integrative oVer to be signiWcantly more valuable to the other party than the distributive one. While in this condition, value assessments of the distributive and integrative initial oVers were signiWcantly Hence, providing some support for hypothesis H6, negotiators who focused on speciWc outcomes more than those who focused on general proWt schedules understood the crucial aspect of integrative oVers-i.e., that integrative oVers are worth more to the other party than are distributive oVers.
Discussion
Results of the second experiment strengthen and extend Wndings of our Wrst experiment. First, they provide additional evidence for the importance of distinguishing between judging the other party's general priorities and assessing his or her speciWc oVer outcomes. Second, they support the notion that considering the opponent's interests by assessing his or her speciWc oVer outcomes during the negotiation process may be more eVective for integrative negotiation than merely assessing the other party's general interest structure, without necessarily taking it into consideration when exchanging oVers. These Wndings expand those of our Wrst experiment, by showing that such cognitive processing has a positive eVect on negotiation outcomes and not only on initial negotiation responses. Finally, they also suggest that it is beneWcial to train negotiators to consider their opponents' interests (i.e., to take their opponents' perspective) throughout the negotiation process, rather than simply recognize them. This is possible and eVective not only for improving performance in the training task, but for other integrative negotiations as well.
General discussion and conclusions
Although much has been written about integrative negotiation, knowledge is still insuYcient regarding the psychological and cognitive determinants of integrative solutions. The distinction we propose between negotiators' understanding of the opponents' general proWt schedules versus their gains for particular oVers relates to this question. From a methodological point of view, the diVerential eVectiveness of these two judgment measures suggests that future research should similarly adopt a range of understanding measures reXecting diVerent levels and forms of processing. In addition to these theory-testing and methodological contributions, our Wndings articulate aspects of negotiator training that can increase the likelihood of achieving integrative outcomes.
The Wndings of the present research go beyond the already-established eVect of experience on Wnal negotiation agreements Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Thompson, 1990a Thompson, , 1990c Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994; Thompson & Hastie, 1990) , by showing that the increased tendency of the negotiators to logroll as they gained more experience was apparent, not only in the Wnal agreements that they reached, but also during the initial stages of their transactions.
While many earlier studies emphasized the key role of understanding the interests of the opponent in achieving more integrative performance over time (Thompson, 1990a (Thompson, , 1990c Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994; Thompson & Hastie, 1990 ), the present Wndings suggest that at least in an unchanging environment, understanding is not a necessary condition. This conclusion is supported in several ways. First, the eVects of repeated experience on understanding were quite limited. Although experience did to some degree improve the estimations of the other party's general interest structure, it did not improve assessments of the other party's speciWc oVer outcomes. Second, the improvement in understanding the other party's general interest structure did not lead to more integrative counter-oVers. Lastly, although improved understanding of the opponent's speciWc oVer outcomes did contribute to logrolling responses, integrative experience signiWcantly enhanced integrative counter-oVer responses, even when controlling for the eVect of such improved understanding. Hence, even though accurately understanding the other party's speciWc outcomes can advance logrolling responses, such understanding does not seem to be a necessary condition for advancing integrative responses of negotiators with experience in a particular task. This Wnding is in line with the notion put forward by Neale and Bazerman (1991) , as well as by Thompson (1990b Thompson ( , 1990c , that experience does not necessarily lead to expertise. Indeed, in repeated negotiations with a particular task, negotiators might learn a particularly eVective strategy, without comprehensively understanding when and why this strategy is eVective (i.e., expertise).
The Wnding that improved assessment of the other party's interests in general did not enhance integrative performance, while accurate assessment of the other party's speciWc oVer values did, suggests that considering and accurately processing available information about the opponent is a signiWcant determinant of successful integrative negotiations. This appears to be consistent with the motivated information processing model of negotiation developed by De Dreu and Carnevale (2003) . Their model underlines the importance of inducing motivation for engaging in deep and systematic processing of information that is or becomes available during the negotiation, for achieving more integrative agreements and revisions of Wxed-pie perceptions.
A distinction between availability of information and processing of information was also suggested by Pinkley et al. (1995) . They found that while full information raised the probability of negotiating integrative agreements, it was not suYcient to ensure achieving them. Although information processing was not directly manipulated or measured in their study, they argue that inferior performance of fully informed negotiators can be explained by, and should be attributed to information processing errors.
In the present study, we directly measured and manipulated information processing, thereby providing more direct evidence for the importance of accurate information processing. In addition, our study addresses a unique form of information processing. We propose that processing information about the other parties' general priorities by assessing their speciWc values for the diVerent oVers throughout the negotiation process-i.e., taking into consideration the opponents' perspective-is beneWcial and improves integrative performance and outcomes. This is consistent with previous Wndings that negotiators' attention to their opponents' goals and expectations, and their ability to adopt the opponents' perspective, is a key to successful negotiation.
Finally, regarding implications for negotiation training, our Wndings imply that simply allowing negotiators to experience integrative negotiations can enhance their tendency to engage in more integrative behavior in repeated negotiations within an unchanging environment. They also indicate that for achieving more, it is not suYcient to teach negotiators to consider the other parties' general interest structure. Merely acknowledging the other parties' interests, without additional cognitive processing activity of the learners, is not enough. It is important that trainees also learn to infer and estimate the other parties' speciWc outcomes. Training negotiators to do so, i.e., to consider their opponents' interests by considering their speciWc outcomes throughout the negotiation process, was shown to be possible and eVective for improving performance, not only in the training task but in other integrative negotiations as well. These results complement several other studies in the negotiation learning literature, which show that although gaining expertise and being able to transfer learning in negotiations may not be easily achieved, it is possible (e.g., Bereby-Meyer et al., 2004; Loewenstein et al., 1999; Mannix et al., 1991; Thompson, 1990c) . The present research pro-vides encouraging evidence concerning an additional training method to those previously proposed (such as analogical reasoning, learning goals, etc.) for achieving such expertise.
We end by noting some limitations to our research. First, our sample consisted of students without previous negotiation experience. Future research should further explore the role of experience and of understanding by examining experienced negotiators as well. A second limitation is that the negotiation tasks we used were artiWcial, and negotiators' utility functions were predetermined by the experimenters, rather than self-generated. Although this is a commonly used method in the negotiation literature, it constrains generalizability. Notwithstanding these limitations, we believe this research has potentially important implications in highlighting the importance, both theoretical and methodological, of diVerentiating between levels and forms of cognitive processing and understanding. This research speciWcally contributes to the literature on social cognition and perspective taking in interpersonal contexts such as negotiations. It shows that mere acknowledgement of others' general interests may not be suYcient, and that the additional inferential step of assessing their speciWc outcomes is important and can be advantageous. Finally, from a practical point of view, our Wndings convey aspects of negotiator training that may increase the likelihood of achieving integrative outcomes.
